受訪者:Professor Kar-Yen Leong 梁家恩副教授
採訪者:Professor Mab Huang 黃默教授
Paraphrased by Yu-Zhe Huang 黃于哲
採訪日期:2022年6月6日
本專題採訪獲「 國家科學及技術委員會人文社會科學研究中心」 補助
I. Professor Leong on East Timor
Professor Leong said “I’m going to speak in a reverse order because my fascination is East Timor. First began with that when I was doing my second master at the University of Essex, The Human Rights Center, which I kind of got interested in the whole issue concerning genocide. Even though my thesis at that time at the University of Essex was primarily looking at the Human Rights Commission in Malaysia, I still had this very deep impression left on me when I was spending a lot of time looking at genocide.”
“Of course, the question of genocide then expanded into my work when I was doing my PhD at the National University of Singapore, Southeast Asian Studies Department. From there, I had a couple of questions that I was trying to deal with in terms of my PhD research. One of them was that given the fact that the Indonesian army have occupied East Timor for at least twenty-four to twenty-five years, what was the consequences that occurred immediately after the East Timorese overwhelmingly decided that they wanted to have an independent country of their own.” said Professor Leong.
“There was also a period of time as well when the Indonesian army left behind a situation where a scorched earth policy had been carried out. So, a lot of infrastructure and even in terms of human relations between East Timorese themselves were broken apart by that period of violence.” Professor Leong said.
My PhD thesis, my project was looking at how these communities of people within East Timorese itself, came together and reconciled with each other. It began by me looking specifically at East Timorese Commission for truth reconciliation and perception, but it expanded up because as I ventured further out into places, further away from the capital, I began to see a lot of dynamics that were deeper, the effects that had been ongoing even way before the events of what had happened immediately after East Timor’s independence.
That was an interesting period of time in which my research grew, took off. After completing my PhD, I also began to think about the violent legacy that was left behind by the Indonesians on East Timor. So, I began to ask, if we look at the things that happened in East Timor, the pattern of violence that had occurred, it is very similar to what we found in Indonesia as well. Indonesia and East Timor share similar patterns of violence, so as I looked away from East Timor, and it was when my research began to gravitate more towards Indonesia.
I began to do a lot more investigation and research as to the reasons why Indonesia, especially in terms of reference to the incident in 1965, why Indonesia has not yet been able to reconcile with that part of history. This was a part of the history where approximately five hundred thousand to one million people were disappeared, taken into custody or put in jails. This was primarily based on allegations that these people were descendants or members of the communist party in Indonesia.
As far as I am concerned, I wanted to investigate to see whether this was actually a genocide as certain scholars have stated. That was what took me to Indonesia where I began to engage with a lot of people who were former political detainees. And also with activists, NGOs, groups of people, to certain extent, who wanted to dig up a part of the history again. That was also where I encountered stories of haunting of ghosts, and it was through my investigation of these stories of hauntings, I was also able to discover mass graves, in which a lot of these former descendants and a lot of alleged members of communist party were murdered and thrown into.
So that became a big part of my project for the past couple of years in terms of me trying to, together with some of my colleagues in Indonesia, searching for these mass graves, and investigating these mass graves and more importantly, in terms of how people remember this particular part of Indonesia’s history, through these stories, through these graves.
II. Professor Leong on the Political Independence in East Timor and Indonesia
Professor Leong said “East Timor just recently had its presidential election. José Ramos-Horta was voted. And this is a really strange thing about East Timor because they tend to have, whenever we look at the presidential candidates, they tend to be same people. So, these are the older generation of leaders in East Timor continue to hold the helmof leadership in this country, and this we’re talking about a really young and smallcountry.”
There’s a population of few million, a half island of Timor, the western part belonging to Indonesia, so it’d seem these same people continue to hold the reign of leadership. I think it really needs some kinds of levels of changes. Because if we look at the population of East Timor, it’s a young country with a lot of young people, but as far as political stability is concerned, I think if we look at East Timor, it’s one of the most successful democracy within South East Asia, one of the most stable democratic country in South East Asia because institutionally speaking, people vote and the winner usually is accepted in a peaceful way.
It’s very different from the situation I saw ongoing in 2006, when the military fought with the police, different leaders or factions, political parties, and there was a lot more violence going on. But East Timor right now, is a lot more stable than what I saw a long time ago in 2006. I think the only problem right now is because East Timor is kind of forced into a situation that it’s a small young country, but it’s heavily dependent on oil as a form of income. That’s why there are a lot of problems they have to face in terms of dealing with a bigger neighbour the down south called Australian, also it’s been constantly in dispute with them over who owns how much particular part of the sea of which is very rich in terms of mineral sources, especially oil.
If we look at Indonesia right now, I’d consider it to be one of the most stable democracy in the region. One of the reason controversies that have occurred it Indonesia is that the current president, Joko Widodo was actually thinking about extending his term for the third time, and there were rumors that he was going to do that. He explicitly said many times that he would not do so. There have been demonstrations and protests against that, so I think there isn’t going to be any possibility for him to revise the Constitution to allow him to take his third term. I don’t think it’s going to happen. Joko is a democrat, so I think he’s going to stick to the rules.
One of the things that I pay attention to is the possibility of another candidate probably coming up and trying again even for the third time or the fourth time if I’m not mistaken, Prabowo Subianto. He is the son-in-law of the former dictator, Suharto. He was involved in special forces long time ago. He was accused of committing certain crimes against humanity, and he was accused also in having helped the President hostage at one point in time. Especially when Abdurrahman Wahid was the president, so there’s a possibility, a danger that because his personality which is very much associated with the new order.
But you know, Suharto’s regime coming back into the picture and there this pattern right now which seems to be quite prevalent in South East Asia where scholars have referred to as democratic regression, to the extent where people associated with the former dictatorship or a with the former authoritarian regimes are coming back in South East Asia again, so it’s kind of worrying. This is also interesting that whenever we talk about Indonesia politics, you cannot ignore Islam when we look at what’s going to happen in 2024, when the next presidential election is.
It’s not just the matter of looking at a particular candidate but also to looking at how Islamic politics in Indonesia at that point time is going to play out. And I think it’s going to be a huge challenge for Prabowo because he has to pick the right person. Or even the next few candidates for that matter, they all have to pick the right people in terms of Islamic parties and Islamic politicians. It’s all balanced out, right? The role which Islam has to play in Indonesia.
It’s going to be very interesting because Islam in Indonesia is very independent, unlike in Malaysia, where the religion itself is very tightly-bound to the state. Islam has more space in Indonesia. It is in fact that it can be seen as being a part of civil society. In that sense, there’s a big challenge for whoever it is, whether it’s Prabowo or maybe even the Governor of Central Java Ganjar Pranowo. It’s going to be a challenge for them in terms of them standing as candidates and choosing properly, or carefully who’s going to run the regime.
III. Professor Leong on Malaysia
Professor Leong said “I think if we look specifically at Indonesia and Malaysia, the thing that I’m usually more concerned about is not so much about assimilation but the amount of political space I think minorities in either Indonesia or Malaysia are given. When I talk about ethnic minorities, I’m not specifically referring to Chinese. But in Malaysia, even we talk about people who are in minority religions, or even for instance, Malaysian Indians for that matter.”
“If we look specifically at Malaysian Chinese, a lot of other ethnic minorities, there’s been a greater opening in terms of post 1998. There’s been the greater space for these minority groups to be engaged politically. Given that they have the space to engage more politically, they are also given a lot more prominence, so in that sense, I think minorities are not so much living within their silos as they were before, but they’ve been more proactive, seen as a part of the system.” Professor Leong continued.
I guess to a certain extent, that’s a good thing. But I think relations, I wouldn’t say it’s tense at this point of time, but there are these tensions which are played upon by certain parties. They’d definitely raise up some of these issues or push up some of these issues. But I’m glad because we have certain political parties and political groups especially within Malaysia.
They’re always trying to, I think the easiest way for any political party to grab attention in Malaysia is to say, “Okay, we’re going to defend this race. We’re going to defend this religion.” It’s the best and easiest way for a lot of political parties in Malaysia or even in Indonesia to say that they are going to protect, in that sense.
But I think there is also a growth in terms of how activists, certain institutions can be. In Malaysia, when we talk about the rule of monarchy. I think the rule of monarchy is that it’s evolving to that extent, which it sees that it’s the protector not only of the interest of majority of people in the country but rather also of the interest of the minorities in this country. From what I see, we’re beginning to have this kind of traditional institution that has the capacity to protect the interest of everybody, not just one specific ethnic.
In Indonesia, what I can see is also that there’s been a growth of different political groups coming forth, which represents the interest or standing on the platform, they’d say, “Okay, we’re going to now, we represent all Indonesians, not just people of one specific group” and not just capitalize on the ethnic factor. In Indonesia and Malaysia, there are, on the other hand, institutions and growing space that allow minorities to be more vocal in terms of demanding their rights and their space that they should’ve been given after all.
IV. Professor Leong on the Role of China
Professor Leong said “Traditionally speaking, the Chinese presence in South East Asia is both physical and there are hundreds of years of migration going back and forth between the two places. Of course, it became more intense with people coming over from the southern part of China because of colonial policies encouraging more people to work the colonial economy. But I think historically speaking, also in terms of China’s relationship with Southeast Asia is that for a lot of nationalists movement in South East Asia were pretty much inspired by the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, which influenced a lot of early nationalists in Southeast Asia. That’s part one.”
And then we have part two, which is where China at that point in time became communist in 1949, and from what I’ve read, from that kind of things that I have done research on a lot of young ethnic Chinese were very fired up by the fact that you have now this new revolutionary reform, a new China.
That is the communist that many young people found very attractive, but in terms of the state relations, the Chinese government became part of the larger communist blocs joiningRussia. China was seen as a threat because we had this incident in 1965 Indonesia. And in Malaysia and Singapore, Southeast Asian states China to be a threat because China was contributing to internal chaos in these countries. China was seen to be fomenting communist movements right through til the eighties and nineties. China has now become the economic super power but strangely enough a long time ago, just as recent as twenty or thirty years ago, the Malaysian passport would state very clearly that you can’t go to China. But now everybody can watch CCTV on Malaysian cable TV right now, and that’s a strange thing.
Well, it’s not really that strange because the situation in China has entirely changed, and it seems to be a global economic power. It’s contributing to major infrastructure programs all throughout Southeast Asia. Trains, planes, automobiles, ports.. So to that extent, they seem to be viable economic partners. And I think the ethnic Chinese in South East Asia are seen as a bridge between China and of course, their own native Southeast Asian countries, but one of the problems, this is the thing, I think that China is not doing correctly. On one hand, it’s emphasizing its soft power.
And it’s reaching out. It knows it has an audience to reach out to, especially in terms of ethnic Chinese in South East Asia. But at the same time they’re also acting in a very aggressive way. I mean you can see it in terms of conflicts that have a lot about South East Asian countries claiming sovereignty over little islands located all throughout the China Sea.
So there’s a conflict on one hand, and there’s the Chinese government, or Chinese State trying to sell economic corporation and friendly ties and cultural ties, so this is the thing that doesn’t jive. All right? So while putting so much time and effort into investing in a country Malaysia, at the same time, they’re also sending planes, coming very close to the airspace space of Malaysia, especially in Sabah. And that is something which I think confuses a lot of Southeast Asian countries. Should we trust them? Or should we not? Of course, in terms of economic part, great.
But they also tend to be very aggressive, which is the problem because if the Chinese are not able to find that balance, it’ll also to a certain extent, affect the relationship between ethnic Chinese people in Southeast Asian countries and all these other ethnic groups there because there’s a possibility that we’ll go back to another Cold War again.
I hope. I mean really don’t know what’s going on behind the mind of a lot of Chinese leaders. I hope they’ll be able to find the balance, but from what I see in terms of the current leadership in China right now, it’s a leadership that is very assertive. When we read things like Wolf warrior diplomacy, this is really aggressive. I mean even if they say, “Aggression is only made to a specific country,”
For example, the US. But the way which they act, at least from what I see is a resurgent China who is intending on that kind of narrative to show the world that “This is our age, this is our century.”, which makes things dangerous in that particular part of the world in Southeast Asia because from what I see, a lot of South East Asian countries are only now beginning to find some kind of balance, or meaning in the sense of what their
Leong: I mean the whole period of nationalism in Southeast Asia, it started about, if we look at the history of a lot of South East Asian countries, we were born in instances of extreme oppression and violence.
V. Professor Leong on US-China Tensions
Professor Leong said “But I think America is on the downtrend. I think with the recent Biden Administration beginning to realize that the period of Pax Americana is over and that its fortress and America is over-stretching itself, so it begins to recede on one hand, and on the other hand, we have this resurgent power, that is the other thing, as one country begins to shrink to that extent, to not to realize that it’s over-stretching itself and that once it starts to recede a little bit, and work on perhaps its internal economics and politics.”
I’m kind of worried about the other factor that is at play here because I’m referring to China again, I feel that there’s also a sense of paranoia. I think sometimes it is inherited in Chinese thinking that they need Taiwan as a counterfoil. That’s how Chinese nationalism asserts itself by constantly using Taiwan as the scapegoat or battering boy, as a whipping boy to assert its own identity. And that’s the thing I’m kind of worried about. Because I think to a certain extent, China also suffers from a sense of paranoia. It believes that the whole world is against it.
This is why always say that in terms of its strategy, it tries to build an extreme strategy. It tries to protect itself, of course, I can understand. A lot of times, when we look at American overtures, it can be quite aggressive. They’re more aggressive when they know what Chinese are doing. If you take it into consideration, if we just take Chinese perspective, what they’re doing is basically just protecting themselves.
Because they are so dependent on China Sea, trade, ships being able to travel freely through South China Sea. That’s why you have Belt and Road Initiative. So in a sense, you have a power that is receding, trying its best to survive and you have a power that is paranoid, constantly trying to reassert itself. So whether the US and China are going to war at any point of time, I’d hope not.
Because I think to a certain extent, China and the US are still what I refer to as rational actors, as opposed to Russia, which is a whole different story altogether. I think these two countries are at least, China is trying to act as rationally as possible because it’s too inbuilt into the global system, trade, its dependence on the countries outside, for its survival and I think it understands a lot of countries are dependent on them for their own survival. It’s a little bit more inbuilt into the global system.
VI. Professor Leong on Taiwan
Professor Leong said “I think on one level, China has been saying that it has been wanting to attack Taiwan for a long time. And America has been saying that whether it’ll actually attack Taiwan is one thing, and that it’ll defend Taiwan. And whether it’ll defend Taiwan is another thing, so I think Taiwan right now is in a very tight spot, but I think to that extent, Taiwan has also done a lot of things which I think are right. I teach a class called public diplomacy, and one of the things that I tell my students all the time in class is that visibility is the key to survival, so what Taiwan has been doing over the past few decades, especially in terms of public diplomacy, is really good.”
It’s constantly keeping it as visible as possible, which is why we have the World Health Association situation going on, and the really intense campaigns that Taiwan have been pushing, signing on to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the three other international human rights covenants, coming out with the tagline “Taiwan can help”, sending out the masks and vaccines even though they’re not recognized. In a sense, it’s doing well, and it’s also making it obvious that it’s a very important part of the global supply chain. Especially, since it’s one of the biggest suppliers of semiconductors to the world.
So, in that sense, you can find similarities with how Singapore carries out its own policies, its own diplomacy. It’s the same thing. It’s a small country in a rough neighborhood. So it makes itself a part of the rules based international order. I think the term uses quite often is the Porcupine Strategy.
I mean Porcupine is one thing. I think Taiwan is also kind of similar to Singapore in that. It’s trying to push to show the fact that it’s a very important part of international community even though the rest doesn’t recognize it as a state. It’s doing a good job and trying to show that it continues to exist. Sometimes you have people walking in Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinking in a particular way, operating in a particular way. On the other hand, people in Ministry of Defense thinking in a particular way and looking at things in a particular way. And the same thing goes with China as well. You might have Ministry of Foreign Affairs trying to put as much effort into diplomacy as possible, but you have no idea what the People’s Liberation Army or the bigwigs at the PLA are thinking about. That’s a problem sometimes.
VII. Professor Leong on His Future Research Project
Professor Leong said “Teaching is probably still going to be the same, but I tend to put a little bit more emphasis on the class I teach on human rights. I also intend to be opening up a class on transitional justice, at some point in time, probably in the next year or so, so that’s going to be interesting for me. I’m also hoping to open up a class on human rights and films which is going to be a general education course at Tamkang University.”
“And in terms of my current research in the next couple of months and years. I’m hoping to be looking at the situation with the extrajudicial killing in the Philippines, this so-called war on drugs. There’s an effort now in the Philippines where they’re trying to exhume bodies of those who were supposed to be executed by unknown government agent because they were suspected drug pushers. So, I’m hoping to be going there soon to look at human remains.” Professor Leong said.